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Abstract 
 
 
 
Aid Determinants in Recent Years : Korean Case 
 
By 
 
Taejun Park 
 
 
 The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the factors which may affect the 
allocation of bilateral aid from Korea in recent years. Both recipient countries’ factors and 
donor interests were considered as variable which may affect the allocation. Recipient 
countries’ factor variables explain their physical needs and political status, and donor interest 
variables explain the economic relationship between Korea and each recipient country. 
According to the regression result of the most reliable model which controlled the recipient-
country fixed effect and included all possible variables, Korean bilateral aid is responsive to 
population of recipient countries, export to recipient countries, import from recipient 
countries, and FDI investment in recipient countries. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 1. Why should we look at this matter?  
 Korea is the only DAC member country which transformed from a recipient country 
to a donor country. It first received aid from international community in 1945 as an 
emergency aid mainly from the US and the UN. The ODA volume received reached an all 
time high in 1969 and started to fall quickly. It started its first official assistances to Indonesia 
and Nigeria in 1987. Korea joined Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010.  
 
Figure 1. Korean ODA flow 
   
  
 DAC carried out a special review on Korean ODA before Korea joined DAC. The 
report pointed out many aspects of Korean ODA which needed to be improved. ODA/GNI 
ratio and tied ODA ratio are cases in point. Thus Committee for International Development 
Cooperation (CIDC) of Korea set a target of 0.15% ODA/GNI ratio by 2012, 0.25% 
ODA/GNI ratio by 2015, and 90% of untied aid ratio by 2015.  
 
2 
 
Table 1. ODA/GNI ratio and untied aid ratio of Korea ODA 
 2003 2005 2007 2009 
2012 
(Target) 
2015 
(Target) 
ODA/GNI ratio 
(Unit:%) 
Korea 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.25 
DAC 0.24 0.32 0.27 0.31   
Untied aid ratio 
(Unit:%) 
Korea 2.5 2.6 24.7 48.3  90.0 
DAC 91.1 91.4 83.9 84.5   
 
 These factors are important quantitative and qualitative aspects of ODA, however 
they are factors that are easily recognized. And setting a target to improve them is not 
difficult because there are already practices of 22 countries and European Commission in 
DAC with longer history of ODA as donor countries.  
 What this study estimates is how much Korea considers recipient countries’ 
circumstances when it gives bilateral aid to various recipient countries. Considering recipient 
countries’ circumstances is very important because it is hard to recognize whether a donor 
country considers recipients’ circumstances by only looking at simple statistics or ODA 
report. More importantly, considering recipient countries’ circumstances is a cornerstone for 
all donors to achieve higher level goals such as Millennium Development Goals or Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The MDG talks about 8 factors. They are all about 
improving recipient countries’ poor conditions which are extreme poverty, primary education, 
gender equality, child mortality rate, maternal health, diseases such as AIDS/HIV and malaria, 
environment, and global partnership for development. Recipient countries’ physical and 
economic needs should be considered for sure to improve these conditions. Measures 
discussed in Paris Declaration are also deeply related to the recipient countries’ circumstances. 
If a donor country tries to align its objectives with recipient countries and use their systems, 
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recipient countries’ social and governmental factors should be considered.  
 Moreover, this study estimates if Korean bilateral aid is related to its economic 
interest variables. If it is related to them, it is hard to say that Korean ODA is altruistic to 
international community. Trade and FDI relationships with recipient countries are considered 
as economic interests of Korea. 
 
 2. Literature Review 
 For long periods, factors that may affect aid allocation have been researched and 
discussed. Mckinlay and Little (1979) divided aid determinants into 2 sides of donors’ 
interests and recipients’ needs. They argued that recipients’ needs are compensates for the 
shortfalls in domestic resources and donors’ interests serve political/security, investment and 
trade interests. Many of early studies on aid determinants followed the dichotomy of 
Mckinlay and Little. On this ground, Maizels & Nissanke (1984) found that multilateral aid 
allocation is determined by recipients’ needs and bilateral aid allocation is determined by 
donors’ interests. In 1994, Trumbull & Wall said that, when recipient country fixed effect is 
controlled, aid received per capita is related to infant mortality and civil/political rights, but 
not to GDP per capita of recipient country. Wall (1995) showed that aid received per capita 
responds to changes in GDP per capita and does not respond to changes in infant mortality 
rate and civil/political rights. Alesina and Dollar (2000) said that GDP per capita, democracy 
level, trade openness, colonial history, and friendlinessat the UN of recipient countries are 
positively correlated to aid per capita received, but not civil/political rights. In 2002, Alesina 
and Weder found that corrupt government does not receive less aid per capita than clean 
government. Neumayer (2003) argued that as economic needs and civil/political development 
needs of recipient countries are high, they tend to receive more aid from the UN. And before 
the Cold War, civil/political rights were positively related to the bilateral aid received. In 
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Bandyopadhyay and Wall’s research (2007), aid from all sources respond to GDP per capita, 
infant mortality rate, government effectiveness, and population of recipient countries in the 
post-Cold War era. When country fixed effects, however, were controlled, civil/political 
rights were positively correlated to aid received. 
 
 
Ⅱ. Korean ODA in Recent Years 
 Korean ODA volume fell sharply from 678.42 US million dollars in 2005 to 416.22 
US million dollars in 2006. Since then, the ODA volume is increasing steadily. It reached 
850.75 US million dollars in 2009. ODA/GNI ratio also fell sharply from 0.1% in 2005 to 
0.05% in 2006. As the ODA volume increases, the ratio is also recovering and reached the 
previously highest level of 0.1% in 2009. In recent years, bilateral aid share occupies about 
70% of total ODA. 
Table 2. General aspects of total Korean ODA for recent 5 years 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Gross Disbursement 
(Unit:2009 Constant USDm) 
678.42 416.22 567.38 758.22 850.75 
ODA/GNI 0.10% 0.05% 0.07% 0.09% 0.10% 
Bilateral share 62.0% 78.2% 71.9% 68.7% 72.4% 
 
 For last 5 years from 2005 to 2009, sectors that total Korean ODA assisted most are 
infrastructure sectors. Social infrastructure sector occupies 44.8% and economic 
infrastructure sector occupies 41.4% of total ODA.   
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Table 3. Korean ODA allocation by sector 
Allocation by sector(Gross Disbursement) 
Social Infrastructure 44.8% 
Economic Infrastructure 41.4% 
Production 6.7% 
Humanitarian Aid 3.2% 
Multisector 2.5% 
Support to NGOs 0.7% 
Unallocated 0.4% 
Debt Relief 0.3% 
Commodity Aid 0.04% 
 
 Iraq is the biggest recipient country of Korean bilateral aid for last 5 years. Following 
countries are Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Cambodia, etc. Most of top 10 recipient 
countries of total Korean bilateral aid are Asian countries.  
 
Table 4. Top 10 recipients of Korean bilateral ODA 
Top 10 Recipients of Gross ODA(USD million) 
1. Iraq 233.63 
2. Viet Nam 164.49 
3. Sri Lanka 125.84 
4. Indonesia 110.82 
5. Cambodia 102.36 
6. Philippines 85.21 
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7. Bangladesh 79.37 
8. Angola 73.43 
9. Laos 68.97 
10. Mongolia 67.66 
 
 On average, 88 recipient countries of Korean bilateral aid received less than 1 US 
million dollars a year, 30 countries received between 1 and 5 US million dollars, 12 countries 
received between 5 and 10 US million dollars, and all of top 10 countries received more than 
10 US million dollars a year. These countries received more than 55% of total Korean 
bilateral aid for 5 years from 2005 to 2009 while 88 least-receiving countries received less 
than 5%. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of recipients according to aid received from Korea 
 
 
 
 The reason why Iraq became a number 1 country in the list is because Korea declared 
a special aid for Iraqi rehabilitation in 2002 and provided enormous amount of aid money for 
5 years from 2003 to 2007. Although the amount is not as huge as that of Iraq, Afghanistan 
also received a special aid for rehabilitation from Korea from 2002.  
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Table 5. Korean ODA to Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Unit:2009  
Constant USDm) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Iraq 0.02 0.04 0.01 42.64 70.79 130.36 46.32 41.61 8.79 6.55 
Afghanistan 0 0 5.47 22.2 21.13 7.75 1.74 2.0 3.62 24.09 
\ 
 
Ⅲ. Empirical model 
1. Recipient factors model 
 In order to know if Korean bilateral aid considers recipient countries’ factors, this 
study borrows a regression model from a previous study. In 2007, Bandyopadhyay and Wall 
used a regression equation below to find if ODA from the world is related to recipients’ 
conditions. 
 
                                                                     
  
                                                                             
                             
                                                                                              
      …(1) 
 
 In this literature paper, dependent variable is real net official development assistance 
from all sources including multilateral aid for country i in year t. Bandyopadhyay and Wall 
looked at post-Cold War era, using three years of data, 1995, 2000, and 2003. They controlled 
a recipient-country fixed effect and a period effect by putting country dummy variables and 
year dummy variables into the model. Generalized least squares method is used, allowing for 
recipient-specific heteroskedasticity. 
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 According to the result, it turned out that the World ODA is related to many of 
recipient factors. When the recipient-country fixed effect was not controlled, GDP per capita, 
infant mortality rate, government effectiveness, and population variables were significant, but 
not civil/political rights. However, when the effect was controlled, all recipient-country 
variables, even including civil/political rights, turned out to be significant to ODA received 
from all sources.  
Figure 3. Regression results of Bandyopadhyay and Wall(2007) 
 
This paper looks at Korean bilateral aid of recent five years, using Bandyopadhyay and 
Wall’s method.  
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 The same GLS method is used, using five years of data from 2005 to 2009.  
 
2. Recipient factors + donors interests model 
 This study also looks at the recipient factors and donors’ interest at the same time. 
Three more variables which may explain Korean economic relationships with recipient 
countries are added to the previous model. 
 
                                                                
  
                                                                        
                             
                                                                              
  
                                                                                     
                           
                                                            
                                            
  
                       …(3) 
 
 Those three variables are each recipient country’s export volume to Korea, import 
volume from Korea, and FDI investment volume from Korea. When there is no trade 
transaction or FDI investment, the value is zero.   
 
 
Ⅳ. Variable data 
 
1. Variables 
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 The dependent variable of this study is each recipient country’s bilateral aid received 
from Korea. The latest five years are used from 2005 to 2009. This variable does not include 
debt reduction. For last five years, Korea gave bilateral aid to 139 countries. Iraq received the 
biggest volume of 270 million US dollars. The unit of variable in this study is US-million-
dollar and the value is 2005 constant price. The data were taken from the OECD statistics site. 
 The first independent variable, GDP per capita, is a variable which explains recipient 
country’s economic needs well. The unit is US-dollar and the value is 2005 constant price. 
The data were taken from the World Bank statistics site.  
 Infant mortality rate is one of the variables which show how serious the recipient 
country’s physical conditions are. It is a number of children, who died when they are one year 
old or younger, per 1,000 live births. The World Bank statistics site also provides the data. 
These two variables of Korean bilateral aid-receiving countries show a negative correlation.  
 
Figure 4. Relationship between GDP per capita and Infant Mortality Rate of Recipients of Korean 
Bilateral Aid 
 
 
 Population is the total number of population of each recipient country, and the data 
are taken from the World Bank. 
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 Civil liberty index and political rights index from Freedom House are used for 
recipient countries’ rights variable. Freedom House grades all countries from score 1 to 7 for 
each index every year. Receiving score 1 stands for being the most free and 7 means the most 
restrictive. These two scores are added, making a simple single variable of civil/political 
rights. However, the value is reversed in this study so that 7 means the most free and 1 means 
the most restrictive. Thus, the higher the score is, the more liberal the recipient country is. 
Among recipient countries of Korean bilateral aid, on average for last five years, Libya, 
Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan were the most restrictive countries with 2 of civil/political 
rights and Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
Nauru, Palau, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, Tuvalu, Uruguay were the most free countries with 
14. All recipient country average is 8.43. 
 Government effectiveness is 1 of 7 variables of World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. The indicators consist of Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of 
Corruption. The government effectiveness indicator rates every country from -2.5 to 2.5. The 
higher the number is, the more effective the government is. In 2009, Singapore, Denmark and 
Finland were top-rated while Somalia, North Korea and Myanmar were rated at the worst 
countries.  
 Export and import variable data are taken from UNCTAD statistics site. They are 
merchandise transaction data, thus service export to Korea and service import from Korea is 
not included. The unit is US-thousand-dollar and the value is 2005 constant price. 
 FDI variable data are taken from Korea Eximbank. Negative flow of FDI, which 
means capital withdrawal, is not included. Only net new investment is used for FDI variable. 
The unit is US-thousand-dollar and the value is 2005 constant price.  
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2. Korean ODA and variables 
 
2.1. Real ODA and Real GDP per capita 
 
Figure 5. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and GDP per capita of Recipients 
 
 
 Since the most recipient countries have low GDP per capita, outliers which have an 
average of GDP per capita over 10,000 US dollars. They are Equatorial Guinea (GDP per 
capita : USD 17,803, bilateral aid from Korea : USD 86,154), Saudi Arabia (14,872 and 
106,739), Oman (14,867 and 106,775), Trinidad and Tobago (14,616 and 83,368), Barbados 
(12,540 and 51,625), Croatia (12,225 and -911,487), Antigua and Barbuda (11,772 and 
123,081), and Seychelles (10,188 and 33,461). Iraq is also excluded because its aid level was 
abnormal with USD 54 million of aid a year. According to the trend line, the variables are 
negatively related. 
 
2.2. Real ODA and Infant Mortality Rate 
 
Figure 6. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Infant Mortality Rate of Recipients 
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 In this graph which shows the relationship between real ODA and infant mortality 
rate, only Iraq is excluded due to its heavy aid volume. The trend line in this graph is almost 
flat. 
 
 2.3 Real ODA and Civil/Political Rights 
 
Figure 7. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Civil/Political Rights of Recipients 
 
 
 Since the maximum value of index is 14 and the minimum is 2, this graph includes 
all recipient countries except for Iraq. The trend line is slightly positive upward sloping.  
 
  2.4 Real ODA and Government Effectiveness 
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Figure 8. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Government Effectiveness of 
Recipients 
 
 
 Only Iraq is also excluded in this graph. The trend line of the graph looks a bit 
negatively skewed. 
 
 2.5 Real ODA and Population 
 
Figure 9. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Population of Recipients 
.  
 
 China and India among the recipients are the extreme cases with 1,317,748,000 
people and 1,124,898,751 people on average each. These two countries and Iraq are excluded 
as outliers of this scatter plot. The line clear shows that as the number of population increases, 
the bilateral aid amount also increases. 
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 2.6 Real ODA and Real Export to Korea 
 
Figure 10. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Real Export to Korea of Recipients 
 
 
 Trade volume of some countries has a huge gap with following countries. China 
exports the biggest volume of USD 53,059 million and Saudi Arabia exports the second 
biggest volume of USD 21,007 million. Indonesia and Malaysia follow with USD 8,841 
million and USD 7,401million each. The biggest export volume in the graph is USD 5,467 
million of Iran. Iraq is also excluded. Among 139 recipient countries, 4 countries do not 
export to Korea. The trend line is slightly positively skewed.  
 
 2.7 Real ODA and Real Import from Korea 
 
Figure 11. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Real Import from Korea of 
Recipients 
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 In this graph, only China is excluded due to the extreme import volume. Its import 
volume from Korea is USD 73,914 million on average. However, the following country is 
Mexico with USD 6,358 million. Iraq is also excluded. Among 139 recipient countries, 3 
countries do not import from Korea. The relationship between aid from Korea and import 
from Korea is positively related. 
 
 2.8 Real ODA and Real FDI from Korea\ 
 
Figure 12. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Real FDI from Korea of Recipients 
 
 
 Korea invests relatively larger amount of FDI on China and Viet Nam. Korea 
invested USD 3,283 million of FDI on average for last five years on China and USD 779 
million on Viet Nam. The biggest FDI volume exists in the graph is USD 284 million of 
Kazakhstan. Iraq is also excluded due to its exceptional aid volume. Among 139 recipient 
countries, 51 countries do not have FDI investment from Korea. The line shows the positive 
correlation. 
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Ⅴ. Result 
 
 1. Case A : All observations available 
 The first case includes all observations available. The number of recipient countries 
is 139 and the number of regression observation is 578. Among 139 countries, 90 countries 
have 5 year observations, 13 countries have 4 year observations, 19 countries have 3 year 
observations, 8 countries have 2 year observations, and 3 countries have 1 year observation. 
And 6 countries do not have any appropriate observations for regression. The 6 countries 
without observations are Nauru, Palestinian Adm. Areas, Somalia, Montenegro, Myanmar, 
and Tuvalu. These countries do not provide GDP data and Civil/Political Rights data. Nauru 
and Palestinian Adm. Areas do not provide any statistic. Below is the sample statistics. 
 
Table 6. Sample statistics of Case A 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RealODA(million) 604 3.314048 9.088015 -1.760828 149.54 
Real GDP per capita 668 3282.159 3594.765 107.8706 25733.99 
Real GDP per capita squared 668 2.37E+07 5.41E+07 11636.06 6.62E+08 
Infant mortality 685 43.22175 31.85332 4.4 139.8 
Infant mortality squared 685 2881.272 3838.125 19.36 19544.04 
Civil liberty & Political rights 679 8.431517 3.559972 2 14 
Govt. Effectiveness 684 -0.4815745 0.6883941 -2.495002 1.514487 
Population(thousand) 685 3.89E+07 1.49E+08 9694 1.33E+09 
Population squared(million) 685 2.37E+16 1.82E+17 9.40E+07 1.77E+18 
Real Export to Korea(thousand) 695 940141.2 5050064 0 7.08E+07 
Real Export to Korea Squared 695 2.64E+13 2.73E+14 0 5.02E+15 
Real Import from Korea(thousand) 695 1114749 6393079 0 8.41E+07 
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Real Import from Korea Squared 695 4.21E+13 4.78E+14 0 7.08E+15 
Real FDI from Korea(thousand) 695 46848.88 303355.5 0 4937385 
Real FDI from Korea Squared 695 9.41E+10 1.16E+12 0 2.44E+13 
 
 When the loan payment from the recipient country surpasses new aid amount from 
Korea, ODA has negative sign. As mentioned above, when there is no trade transaction or 
FDI investment, the value is zero. And FDI investment withdrawal, which may cause a 
negative value, is not included.  
 
Table 7. Regression Result of Recipient Factors Model of Case A 
Dependent variable : 
Real ODA from Korea 
(Year 2005 ~ 09) 
Recipient factors model (Real : 2005년 기준) 
no fixed effects with fixed effects 
Coefficient t-statictic Coefficient t-statictic 
Common intercept 3.694965 5.63 6.620637 1.29 
2006 dummy -0.0211413 -0.13 -0.0373423 -0.38 
2007 dummy 0.2635307 1.56 0.0797093 0.69 
2008 dummy 0.3673442 2.05 -0.0503785 -0.36 
2009 dummy 0.2110458 1.1 -0.1065104 -0.59 
Real GDP per capita -0.0004423 -3.85 -0.0001445 -0.98 
Real GDP per capita squared 1.68E-08 2.35 4.40E-09 0.66 
Infant mortality -0.0508845 -4.33 -0.1328687 -2.08 
Infant mortality squared 0.000149 2.11 0.000601 1.91 
Civil/political rights -0.0647482 -2.59 0.0462167 0.57 
Government effectiveness -0.5985435 -4.6 -0.4870171 -1.13 
Population 3.12E-08 6.36 1.33E-07 2.12 
Population squared -2.17E-17 -5.04 -6.83E-17 -1.9 
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 The first model of case A is recipient factors model without fixed effects (hereafter, it 
is called model A-1.) This model shows that all recipient factors variables are significant. 
Real GDP per capita is negatively significant and its squared variable is positively significant. 
Infant mortality rate is also negatively significant and its squared variable is also positively 
significant. Civil/political rights variable is positively significant while government 
effectiveness variable is negatively related. Population is positively significant and its 
squared variable is negatively significant. Following graphs show the relationships between 
bilateral aid from Korea and each variable, using significant coefficients of model A-1. 
 
Figure 13. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model A-1 
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The second model of case A is recipient factors model with fixed effects (hereafter, it 
is called model A-2.) In this model, recipient country fixed effect is controlled by putting 
country dummy variables. This model shows that only two variables among recipient factors 
are significant. They are infant mortality rate and population. The squared forms of the 
variables, however, are not significant. Following graphs show the relationships between 
bilateral aid from Korea and each variable, using significant coefficients of model A-2. 
 
Figure 14. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model A-2 
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Table 8. Regression Result of Recipient Factors + Donor Interest Model of Case A 
Dependent variable : 
Real ODA from Korea 
(Year 2005 ~ 09) 
Recipient factors + Donor interests  model (Real : 2005년 기준) 
no fixed effects with fixed effects 
Coefficient t-statictic Coefficient t-statictic 
Common intercept 2.98341 4.9 10.49634 2.16 
2006 dummy -0.0743993 -0.4 -0.1568882 -2.38 
2007 dummy 0.2227097 1.29 -0.0143593 -0.16 
2008 dummy 0.3487089 1.76 -0.031751 -0.26 
2009 dummy 0.2521036 1.21 -0.2112109 -1.26 
Real GDP per capita -0.0004517 -4.07 -0.0002902 -2.56 
Real GDP per capita squared 1.59E-08 2.33 1.48E-08 3.18 
Infant mortality -0.0497081 -4.81 -0.1562545 -2.99 
Infant mortality squared 0.0001352 2.18 0.0005978 2.89 
Civil/political rights 0.000851 0.03 0.0516218 0.81 
Government effectiveness -0.8390114 -4.25 -0.511213 -1.56 
Population 3.63E-08 7.59 1.13E-07 1.49 
Population squared -3.24E-17 -7.85 -1.23E-16 -1.9 
Real Export to Korea 1.15E-07 1.04 -2.58E-06 -5.45 
Real Export to Korea Squared 4.49E-16 0.17 2.86E-14 7.25 
Real Import from Korea -3.75E-07 -3.83 4.69E-07 1.44 
Real Import from Korea Squared 9.81E-16 0.56 -8.28E-15 -2.53 
Real FDI from Korea 0.0000199 6.47 4.33E-07 0.11 
Real FDI from Korea Squared -2.85E-12 -5.38 -2.87E-13 -0.58 
 
 The third model of case A is recipient factors and donor interest model without fixed 
effects (hereafter, it is called model A-3.) In this model, recipient factors variables show 
similar results with those of the model 1. The only difference is that civil/political rights 
variable in the model 3 is not significant. Among donor interest variables, export variables are 
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not significant. Import from Korea variable is significant but its squared variable is not 
significant. FDI variables are both significant with different sign each. Following graphs 
show the relationships between bilateral aid from Korea and each variable, using significant 
coefficients of model A-3. 
 
Figure 15. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model A-3 
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 When the country fixed effect of recipient factors and donor interest model is 
controlled (hereafter, this model is called model A-4), the results drastically change. Among 
recipient factors, only GDP per capita variables and infant mortality variables turn out to be 
related to the bilateral aid of Korea. Export variables both show significance. Real import 
from Korea squared is significant with its t-value smaller than negative 2. No other variable 
among donor interest variables is significant. Following graphs show the relationships of 
variables in the model A-4.  
 
Figure 16. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model A-4 
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 2. Case B : Except Iraq and Afghanistan 
 The second case excludes Iraq and Afghanistan from case A, because the bilateral 
aids to those two countries were special cases for rehabilitation purposes. They may interrupt 
analyzing the general trend of Korean bilateral aid. After eliminating observations of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 569 observations are left. In the previous case, Iraq provided 5 year 
observations, but Afghanistan provided only 4 year observations due to missing values.  
 
Table 9. Sample statistics of Case B 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RealODA(million) 594 2.849097 6.220807 -1.760828 52.48728 
Real GDP per capita 659 3311.67 3609.045 107.8706 25733.99 
Real GDP per capita squared 659 2.40E+07 5.44E+07 11636.06 6.62E+08 
Infant mortality 675 42.58267 31.04843 4.4 134.2 
Infant mortality squared 675 2775.86 3614.114 19.36 18009.64 
Civil liberty & Political rights 669 8.484305 3.558553 2 14 
Govt. Effectiveness 674 -0.4662855 0.6814037 -2.495002 1.514487 
Population(thousand) 675 3.91E+07 1.50E+08 9694 1.33E+09 
Population squared(million) 675 2.41E+16 1.84E+17 9.40E+07 1.77E+18 
Real Export to Korea(thousand) 685 936607.7 5083469 0 7.08E+07 
Real Export to Korea Squared 685 2.67E+13 2.75E+14 0 5.02E+15 
Real Import from Korea(thousand) 685 1128376 6438596 0 8.41E+07 
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Real Import from Korea Squared 685 4.27E+13 4.82E+14 0 7.08E+15 
Real FDI from Korea(thousand) 685 47418.6 305520.8 0 4937385 
Real FDI from Korea Squared 685 9.55E+10 1.17E+12 0 2.44E+13 
 
 
Table 10. Regression Result of Recipient Factors Model of Case B 
Dependent variable : 
Real ODA from Korea 
(Year 2005 ~ 09) 
Recipient factors model (Real : 2005년 기준) 
no fixed effects with fixed effects 
Coefficient t-statictic Coefficient t-statictic 
Common intercept 5.036972 9.44 4.440358 1.24 
2006 dummy 0.0147922 0.12 -0.0585376 -0.92 
2007 dummy 0.4383017 3.36 0.2541886 2.99 
2008 dummy 0.8911036 5.36 0.4079776 3.3 
2009 dummy 0.6518071 3.8 0.3048623 2.26 
Real GDP per capita -0.0006747 -7.3 0.0000757 0.63 
Real GDP per capita squared 2.65E-08 4.47 -5.75E-09 -1.35 
Infant mortality -0.061068 -6.29 -0.0613984 -1.47 
Infant mortality squared 0.0002009 3.19 0.0004565 1.68 
Civil/political rights -0.1013626 -4.52 0.0757216 1.9 
Government effectiveness 0.1007033 0.94 -0.0192326 -0.11 
Population 2.86E-08 6.55 1.79E-07 5.14 
Population squared -2.02E-17 -5.13 -9.12E-17 -3.28 
 
 Compared with the result of regression model 1 of case A, model 1 of case B shows 
only a different result of one variable, government effectiveness. In the model A-1, the 
government effectiveness variable was significant with t-value of -4.6. However, it is not 
significant with t-value of 0.94 in the model B-1. All other variables except the government 
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effectiveness are significant in this model. Following graphs also show the relationships 
between bilateral aid from Korea and recipient factor variables. 
 
Figure 17. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model B-1 
 
 
 
 
 If the country fixed effect of model B-1 is controlled, which stands for the model B-2, 
all variables show no significance except population variables. Population and population 
squared variables are significant with t-values of 5.14 and -3.28 each. Among the graphs 
below, only population graph shows significant relationship. 
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Figure 18. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model B-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Regression Result of Recipient Factors + Donor Interest Model of Case B 
Dependent variable : 
Real ODA from Korea 
(Year 2005 ~ 09) 
Recipient factors + Donor interests model (Real : 2005년 기준) 
no fixed effects with fixed effects 
Coefficient t-statictic Coefficient t-statictic 
Common intercept 3.411719 7.43 4.591743 1.27 
2006 dummy -0.055626 -0.54 -0.0924047 -1.33 
2007 dummy 0.2786745 2.57 0.1437472 1.69 
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2008 dummy 0.488127 3.44 0.1324506 1.15 
2009 dummy 0.4750401 2.79 0.0882434 0.59 
Real GDP per capita -0.0006237 -7.36 0.0000947 0.73 
Real GDP per capita squared 2.54E-08 4.27 -6.90E-09 -1.33 
Infant mortality -0.047782 -6.03 -0.0590754 -1.23 
Infant mortality squared 0.0001439 2.88 0.0002854 0.94 
Civil/political rights -0.0031586 -0.13 0.0735465 1.34 
Government effectiveness -0.176906 -1.47 0.110053 0.53 
Population 3.45E-08 9.1 1.78E-07 3.81 
Population squared -3.15E-17 -9.62 -8.57E-17 -4.16 
Real Export to Korea 5.56E-08 0.98 5.05E-07 2.94 
Real Export to Korea Squared 2.72E-16 0.12 3.19E-15 0.97 
Real Import from Korea -2.93E-07 -2.72 -2.59E-07 -1.67 
Real Import from Korea Squared 5.19E-16 0.31 -6.98E-15 -2.31 
Real FDI from Korea 0.0000203 6.85 7.27E-06 3.43 
Real FDI from Korea Squared -2.89E-12 -5.63 -1.41E-12 -3.74 
 
 In the recipient factor and donor interest model of case B, Korean bilateral aid is 
responsive to some recipient factor variables and donor interest variables. Those recipient 
factor variables are real GDP per capita, infant mortality, population, and their squared 
variables. And the significant donor interest variables are real import from Korea, real FDI 
from Korea, and real FDI from Korea squared.  
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Figure 19. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model B-3 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the last model of this study, only population and its squared variable show 
significance among recipient variables. And aid is responsive to every donor interest aspect. 
Real export, real import squared, real FDI, and real FDI squared are significant variables 
among donor interest variables.  
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Figure 20. The Relationship between Real ODA from Korea and Recipient Variables of Model B-4 
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Ⅵ. Conclusion 
 According to the result of country fixed effect model of Bandyopadhyay and Wall 
(2007), the world ODA is clearly associated with recipient’s conditions. As a recipient’s GDP 
per capita increases, the country receives less aid from outside. As a GDP per capita gets over 
about 15 thousand dollars, however, the aid increases again. The ODA received also increases 
as the infant mortality rate increase, but it falls as the rate gets over about 110 of every 1,000 
children. As the people of recipient country have better civil/political rights, and as the 
government is more effective, the country tends to receive more aid. The population of a 
recipient country also affects the aid received. As the population increases, the country also 
gets more aid. However, it starts to decrease as the size of population gets over about 500 
millions.  
 However, Korea’s aid does not clearly consider recipient’s conditions. The models 
which best describe Korean bilateral aid trend are model A-4 and B-4 because they control 
recipient country fixed effect and include recipient factors and donor interest at the same time. 
If A-4 is considered to be a true model of Korea bilateral aid, there are some aspects needed 
to be improved for real altruistic contribution to the international community. Aid is 
responsive to only real GDP per capital and infant mortality rate among many recipient 
factors. The relationship between aid and GDP per capita is quadratic. As real GDP per capita 
of recipient country increases, the aid amount decreases. It seems that Korea considers 
recipient country’s economic needs. However, as the real GDP per capita gets over about 
10,000 US dollars, the aid starts to increase. Korea gives less aid to richer countries in low 
and middle income country group, but more aid to richer countries in high income country 
group. In the case of infant mortality, Korea gives more aid to countries with the lower rate. 
That is, Korea gives less aid to countries which have more serious physical needs. Instead of 
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considering other recipient factors, trade relationships are considered when giving aid. 
Korean bilateral aid is negatively responsive to both real export to Korea and real import 
from Korea. As Korea trade more, it tends to give less aid. 
 As mentioned earlier, including Iraq and Afghanistan may hinder exact analysis of 
Korean bilateral aid trend, because those countries are special case countries. Thus, the 
results of model B-4 may give us a more reliable snapshot of trends. According to the results 
of this model, Korean bilateral aid does not respond to any recipient factors except for 
population. Instead, it is responsive to all donor interest variables. As the recipient country 
exports more, it receives more bilateral aid from Korea. Real import from Korea variable has 
an opposite sign from real export from Korea variable. As it imports more from Korea, it 
receives less aid from Korea. Iraq is the biggest recipient country in the model of A-4, but its 
FDI investment volume from Korea is relatively small. Thus, as Iraq and Afghanistan are 
excluded from the data set, FDI variables show significance. Korea gives more bilateral aid, 
as it invests more FDI in the recipient countries.  
 This study shows that Korean bilateral aid is more responsive to economic interest of 
Korea than to recipient circumstances. As Korea became a Development Assistance 
Committee member, it is time to think of real altruistic role of Korea as a donor. Altruistic 
ODA which considers recipient circumstances is a fundamental behavior of true donors in the 
international community, not to mention Millennium Development Goals or Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness. There is a limitation of this study. The study does not find if the 
responsiveness of Korean bilateral aid to its economic interests is led by any Korean 
government policy. Certain policies may have affected the responsiveness, or there may have 
been no cause of the responsiveness. However, the most important factor is that Korea 
bilateral aid is more responsive to donor interests than to recipient conditions. This may be 
seen as an egoistic behavior to other members of the international society. To avoid this 
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egoistic image and to play a humanitarian role of DAC member country, Korea should know 
how much its recipient countries need physical and economical assistance from outside. 
Korea should also consider how effectively its recipient countries can use assistance from 
outside. All these aspects should be counted in the ODA strategy of a donor country of DAC.  
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